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INTRODUCTION
Imagine a world in which a supervisor begins to have sex with a
subordinate employee. After a year of sex with the supervisor, the
employee gets married and decides to end the relationship. But when
the employee tries to end the sexual relationship, the supervisor says
that the employee will lose their job if the sex does not continue.
Eventually the supervisor summons the employee into the supervisor’s
office and asks the employee if a choice has been made. The employee
says that there will be no more sex. Irate, the supervisor tells the
employee to leave and follows the employee out, yelling that the
employee will be fired. The next morning, the employee is fired.
This situation, in fact, requires no imagination. The employee’s
name was Alshafi Tate, his supervisor’s name was Dawn Burban, and
Tate was forced to choose between sex and losing his job.1 Tate chose
to end the sexual relationship, and he was fired the morning after he
told Burban that he wasn’t “messing with” her anymore. 2 Not every
∗ J.D. candidate, May 2009, Chicago-Kent College of Law; B.A., Bradley
University. The author would like to thank Professor Richard J. Gonzalez of
Chicago-Kent College of Law for his mentorship throughout law school and
guidance in writing this article.
1
See Tate v. Executive Mgmt. Serv., Inc., 546 F.3d 528, 529-31 (7th Cir.
2008), cert. denied, 129 S.Ct. 1379 (2009).
2
Id.
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employee is fired the morning after refusing an ultimatum for sex from
their supervisor. However, for many employees across the country, the
situation described above, in which a subordinate employee must resist
the sexual advances of a supervisor, is all too common. Employees in
these situations must make a choice between submitting to their
supervisor’s demands or rejecting the harassment. For those
employees who reject the advances, they risk the consequences
attendant to rebuffing a supervisor’s sexual advances. While some
supervisors may merely accept that no means no, other supervisors
may continue to harass employees or seek retribution for the rejection
by changing work assignments, demeaning the employee, giving
negative performance evaluations, or as in Mr. Tate’s case, firing the
employee.
Employees in these situations who are sexually harassed by their
supervisors and oppose such harassment are protected by the
retaliation provision of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 3 For
the protections of Title VII’s retaliation provision to apply, however,
an employee must have engaged in a protected activity. 4 The
retaliation provision provides that an employee has engaged in a
protected activity if they have “opposed” an unlawful employment
practice. 5 Some activities by an employee in opposition to an unlawful
employment practice, such as complaining of unwanted harassment to
management or human resources, or filing a charge the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission, are widely accepted as fitting
within Title VII’s retaliation provision. 6 But Title VII does not define
3

See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2006) (barring an employer from retaliating
against an employee because the employee “has opposed any practice made an
unlawful employment practice by” Title VII).
4
See id.
5
Id.
6
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2006); Johnson v. Booker T. Wash. Broad. Serv.,
Inc., 234 F.3d 501, 507 (11th Cir. 2000) (“Statutorily protected expression includes
filing complaints with the EEOC and complaining to superiors about sexual
harassment.”); Joan M. Savage, Note, Applying the EEOC Deterrence Approach to
the Adverse Employment Action Prong in a Prima Facie Case for Title VII
Retaliation, 46 B.C. L. REV. 215, 222 (2004) (“The most typical type of
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opposed, and the exact limits of what an employee must do to have
opposed unlawful activity are unclear. 7 In particular, despite how often
it may occur in the workplace, the question of whether an employee
who rejects a supervisor’s sexual advances has opposed an unlawful
employment practice is an unanswered and controversial issue.
The Supreme Court has never ruled on the issue. Numerous
district courts have touched on it, but they are sharply divided. 8 Some
hold that resisting sexual advances falls squarely within Title VII’s
protections, 9 while others hold that without more, mere rejection of
sexual advances is not protected activity. 10 Only two federal circuit
courts of appeal have addressed the issue and those circuits are also
split. The Fifth Circuit recently held that an express rejection of a
supervisor’s sexual advances does not qualify as protected activity
under Title VII. 11 The Eight Circuit, on the other hand, has held that an
employee engages in “the most basic form of protected activity” by
resisting a supervisor’s sexual advances. 12 Faced with this precise
participation involves the plaintiff filing a discrimination charge against his or her
employer, but also includes other activities, such as providing testimony or assisting
in an investigation.”); Anna Ku, Note, “You’re Fired!” Determining Whether a
Wrongly Terminated Employee Who Has Been Reinstated with Back Pay Has an
Actionable Title VII Retaliation Claim, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1663, 1669 (2007)
(“A complaining party may make a formal discrimination charge against her
employer . . . Also, an employee may informally testify or otherwise participate in a
discrimination charge against her employer.”) (citations omitted).
7
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2006).
8
See, e.g., Black v. City & County of Honolulu, 112 F. Supp. 2d 1041, 1049
(D. Haw. 2000) (collecting cases); Ross v. Baldwin County Bd. of Educ., 2008 WL
820573, *4-6 (S.D. Ala. 2008) (collecting cases).
9
E.g. Quarles v. McDuffie County, 949 F. Supp. 846, 853 (S.D. Ga. 1996)
(holding that rebuffing a supervisor’s sexual advances is “the most basic form” of
protected activity).
10
E.g. Speer v. Rand McNally & Co., 1996 WL 667810, *8 n.4 (N.D. Ill.
1996) (“While [plaintiff] also alleges that [her supervisor] retaliated against her for
her refusal of his sexual advances, her refusal is not the type of ‘protected activity’
which is properly the source of a Title VII retaliation claim.”).
11
LeMaire v. Louisiana Dep’t of Transp. & Dev., 480 F.3d 383, 389 (5th Cir.
2007).
12
Ogden v. Wax Works, Inc., 214 F.3d 999, 1007 (8th Cir. 2000).
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issue in Tate v. Executive Management Services, Inc., the Seventh
Circuit declined to decide the issue but held that Mr. Tate’s rejection of
his supervisor’s advances and ultimatum did not constitute protected
activity under Title VII. 13
The Seventh Circuit’s decision in Tate and holdings by other
courts that rebuffing a supervisor’s sexual advances is not protected
activity under Title VII could have significant consequences for
employees resisting workplace harassment. It is an unfortunate reality
that many employees face sexual harassment in the workplace.
Congress recognized that reality when it enacted Title VII to protect
employees from harassment. 14 It is another unfortunate reality that
many employees who resist or oppose unlawful employment practices
like sexual harassment face retribution from their employer. That is
why Congress included a retaliation provision in Title VII. 15 The
retaliation provision of Title VII is designed allow employees to
protect themselves and oppose what they believe in good faith to be an
unlawful employment practice. 16
As more employees try to protect themselves from unlawful
employment practices, retaliation claims filed with the E.E.O.C. have
doubled over the past fifteen years. 17 While reporting harassment to
human resources or participating in an investigation are clearly
protected activities under Title VII, 18 an employee’s first line of
13

546 F.3d 528, 533 (7th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S.Ct. 1379 (U.S. 2009).
The court held that Mr. Tate did not have a reasonable good faith belief that he was
harassed by his supervisor and therefore had not engaged in protected activity under
Title VII. Id.
14
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2006) (forbidding discrimination in
employment on the basis of sex).
15
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2006) (outlawing an employer from retaliating
against an employee because the employee “has opposed any practice made an
unlawful employment practice by” Title VII).
16
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2006); Clark County Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532
U.S. 268, 270-72 (2001) (per curiam) (an employee does not have to oppose an
employment practice that is actually unlawful, employee must merely have a
reasonable belief that the practice violates Title VII).
17
Glenn George, Revenge, 83 TUL. L. REV. 439, 441 (2008).
18
See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
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defense against a harasser may often be the rejection of sexual
advances. The question of whether rejecting a supervisor’s sexual
advances is protected by Title VII may have an extraordinary impact
on how employees can resist workplace harassment and whether an
employer could be liable when a supervisor gives the ultimatum,
“continue to have sex or forfeit your job,” and the employee says “no.”
If courts like Tate continue to draw the line in favor of employers,
employees across the country may lose protection for one of the
simplest ways to oppose harassment and the practical impact of Title
VII’s retaliation clause will be diminished.
This comment argues that to avoid these consequences and remain
true to the language, purpose, and practical applications of Title VII’s
retaliation clause, courts should hold that an in most circumstances, an
employee who rebuffs their supervisor’s sexual advances has
“opposed” an unlawful employment practice. Courts should still
examine the facts of each case, but when the facts are close, the line
should be drawn in favor of the employee.
Part I provides a brief introduction to the relevant Title VII sexual
harassment and retaliation law necessary to understand the Seventh
Circuit’s holding in Tate. Part II examines the judicial precedent set for
Tate, including the circuit split between the Fifth and Eighth circuits.
Part III discusses the facts, holding, and reasoning of Tate. Part IV
examines the Tate decision in light of the language of the retaliation
provision and its recent interpretation by the Supreme Court. Part V
discusses additional policy considerations that weigh in favor of
protecting employees in this situation, including the importance of the
supervisor-employee relationship, the purpose of the retaliation
provision, and the practical impact of the retaliation clause. Finally,
this comment concludes that the Seventh Circuit’s holding in Tate was
incorrect and that opposition activity under the retaliation provision
should usually include employees who rebuff their supervisor’s sexual
advances.
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I. TITLE VII
A. Sexual Harassment
Title VII was enacted to promote equality and reduce
discrimination in the workplace. 19 As part of these goals, Title VII
forbids discrimination in employment on the basis of sex.20 A significant
body of case law on sexual harassment law has developed out of Title VII’s
ban on sex based discrimination. While a sexual harassment claim is
distinct from a retaliation claim, a basic understanding of sexual
harassment claims is important because this body of law can impact
whether an employee’s opposition is covered by the retaliation provision
and the two types of claims are usually brought together.21 A plaintiff
alleging sexual harassment under Title VII can allege two different causes
of action—a hostile work environment or quid pro quo claim. The primary
difference between the two is that a hostile work environment claim
focuses on proof that the harassment was severe or pervasive enough to
create a hostile or offensive work environment,22 whereas a quid pro quo
19

See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2006); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411
U.S. 792, 800 (“The language of Title VII makes plain the purpose of Congress to
assure equality of employment opportunities and to eliminate those discriminatory
practices and devices which have fostered racially stratified job environments to the
disadvantage of minority citizens.”). Title VII’s language has been construed and
interpreted broadly in order to accomplish the statute’s remedial purpose. Motorola,
Inc. v. McLain, 484 F.2d 1339, 1344 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 936
(1974).
20
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2000) (providing that “[i]t shall be an unlawful
employment practice for an employer. . .to discriminate against any individual with
respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because
of such individual’s. . .sex”).
21
See generally Eisha Jain, Note, Realizing the Potential of the Joint
Harassment/Retaliation Claim, 117 YALE L.J. 120 (2007) (discussing the interplay
between harassment and retaliation claims).
22
To establish a prima facie case of sexual harassment based on hostile work
environment, a plaintiff must demonstrate that: (1) she was subjected to unwelcome
harassment; (2) the harassment was based on sex; (3) the sexual harassment had the
effect of unreasonably interfering with the plaintiff’s work performance in creating
an intimidating, hostile or offensive working environment that seriously affected the
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harassment claim focuses on situations where an employee’s submission
to sexual demands is made a condition of tangible employment
benefits. 23
These categories of cases are relevant to retaliation claims
because a retaliation claim requires a plaintiff to show that they had a
reasonable, good faith belief that they opposed an unlawful
employment practice. 24 Since retaliation claims and harassment claims
are usually brought together, the underlying harassment claim can
impact the reasonableness of the plaintiff’s belief that she opposed an
unlawful employment practice. 25 The facts supporting harassment and
psychological well-being of the plaintiff; and (4) there is a basis for employer
liability. Robinson v. Sappington, 351 F.3d 317, 328-29 (7th Cir. 2003), cert. denied,
542 U.S. 937 (2004). To prove that a hostile work environment existed, a plaintiff
must also prove that the conduct was so severe or pervasive that it altered the
conditions of her employment. Jackson v. Co. of Racine, 474 F.3d 493, 499 (7th Cir.
2007).
23
To establish a prima facie case of sexual harassment based on quid pro quo
harassment, a plaintiff must prove that: (1) he is a member of a protected group; (2)
the sexual advances were unwelcome; (3) the harassment was sexually motivated;
(4) the employee’s reaction to the supervisor’s advances affected a tangible aspect of
her employment; and (5) employer liability has been established. Bryson v. Chicago
State Univ., 96 F.3d 912, 915 (7th Cir. 1996). See Mary M. v. N. Lawrence Cmty.
Sch. Corp., 131 F.3d 1220, 1226 n.7 (7th Cir. 1997) (“[H]arassment, occurs when
the receipt of benefits or the maintenance of the status quo is conditioned on
acquiescence to sexual advances.”). The Supreme Court has largely abandoned the
use of the quid pro quo and hostile work environment labels and instead
distinguishes harassment claims based on whether a supervisor takes a tangible
employment action against a subordinate. A tangible employment action constitutes a
significant change in employment status, “such as hiring, firing, failing to promote, [or]
reassignment with significantly different responsibilities.” Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth,
524 U.S. 742, 760-65 (1998); Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807-08,
(1998). Many plaintiffs still frame their causes of action using those categories
because they have separate analytical frameworks that are useful in distinguishing
between different types of cases. See supra notes 22-23.
24
Fine v. Ryan Int’l Airlines, 305 F.3d 746, 752 (7th Cir. 2002).
25
See Clover v. Total Sys. Serv., Inc., 176 F.3d 1346, 1351-52 (11th Cir. 1999)
(holding that the plaintiff did not engage in a statutorily protected activity because
her belief that she opposed hostile work environment sexual harassment was not
objectively reasonable).
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retaliation claims also frequently overlap, although the claims have
different analytical frameworks.
B. Retaliation
Title VII’s retaliation provision protects employees from retribution by
employers when speaking out against unlawful employment practices.26
The retaliation provision provides, in pertinent part:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to
discriminate against any of his employees . . . because he has opposed
any practice made an unlawful employment practice by this
subchapter, or because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or
participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing
under this subchapter. 27
The sentence outlawing discrimination because an employee has
opposed an unlawful employment practice is known as the retaliation
provision’s opposition clause.28 The following sentence, which bans
discrimination based on participation in an investigation of an unlawful
employment practice is known as the participation clause. 29 Both clauses
protect an employee from retaliation but different sets of facts implicate
each clause. An employee’s rebuff of a supervisor’s sexual advances,
without reporting or discussing the advances with anyone else, falls under
the opposition clause.30
To prove a prima facie case of retaliation under either clause, a
plaintiff must show that (1) he engaged in a statutorily protected activity,
(2) an adverse action was taken by his employer, and (3) there is a causal

26

42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-3 (2006).
Id.
28
Id.
29
Id.
30
See Tate v. Executive Mgmt. Servs, Inc., 546 F.3d 528, 529-31 (7th Cir.
2008), cert. denied, 129 S.Ct. 1379 (U.S. 2009).
27
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connection between the two.31 The second two elements have been the
subject of extensive litigation. With regard to the second element, the
Supreme Court has adopted a broad objective standard for what
constitutes an adverse employment action and noted that an adverse
action may constitute a wide variety of actions depending on each
workplace and employee. 32 To prove the third element of causation, a
plaintiff must present evidence that an employer would not have taken
an adverse employment action “but for” her protected activity. 33
The first element of a plaintiff’s prima facie retaliation case is less
developed. To prove that a plaintiff engaged in protected activity, a
plaintiff may claim that he engaged in protected activity under either
the participation or opposition clause of Title VII’s retaliation

31

Boumehdi v. Plastag Holdings, L.L.C, 489 F.3d 781, 792 (7th Cir. 2007);
Murray v. Chicago Transit Auth., 252 F.3d 880, 890 (7th Cir. 2001). An employee’s
claim for retaliation under either clause is analyzed under the standard Title VII
McDonnell Douglas burden shifting formula. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,
411 U.S. 792 (1973). If a plaintiff proves a prima facie case of retaliation, the burden of
proof shifts to the employer to show a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. If
the employer produces “evidence which, taken as true, would permit the conclusion that
there was a nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse action,” then the burden shifts back to
the employee to prove that the reason was merely a pretext for discrimination. St. Mary's
Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 508-10 (1993); E.E.O.C. v. Our Lady of the Resur.
Med. Ctr., 77 F.3d 145, 148-49 (7th Cir. 1996).
32
Burlington Northern v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 67-70 (2006). The Seventh
Circuit has noted that an adverse employment action must not be a mere
inconvenience. Griffin v. Potter 356 F.3d 824, 829 (7th Cir. 2004). A plaintiff may
prove an adverse employment action by presenting direct evidence showing “a
‘convincing mosaic’ of circumstantial evidence that ‘allows a jury to infer
intentional discrimination by the decision maker’” or indirectly by showing that she
was treated less favorably by similarly situated employees. Rhodes v. Ill. Dep’t. of
Trans., 359 F.3d 498, 504 (7th Cir. 2004); Moser v. Ind. Dep’ts of Corr., 406 F.3d
895, 905 (7th Cir. 2005). Adverse employment actions include “job application
procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee
compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of
employment.” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2000); Rehling v. City of Chicago, 207 F.3d
1009, 1018 (7th Cir. 2000).
33
Moser v. Ind. Dep’t of Corr., 406 F.3d 895, 904 (7th Cir. 2005) (quoting
Wells v. Unisource Worldwide, Inc., 289 F.3d 1001, 1008 (7th Cir. 2002)).
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provision. 34 The participation clause covers an employee’s
participation in any type of investigation of an unlawful employment
practice. 35 Under the opposition clause, an employee must have
opposed any unlawful employment practice. 36 A plaintiff does not
have to prove that the practice he opposed was actually unlawful. 37
Rather, an employee only needs to show that he reasonably believed in
good faith that he opposed a practice that violated Title VII. 38 Thus, a
plaintiff can lose on his sexual harassment claim but still prevail under
a retaliation theory. 39
Still, what qualifies as having opposed unlawful discrimination
under the opposition clause is unclear. Title VII does not define
“opposed,” but it is commonly understood to include making a formal
or sometimes informal complaint to an employer about the
harassment. 40 This serves to put an employer on notice about the
harassment, and notice is an implicit element in a Title VII retaliation
claim. 41 Whether rebuffing a supervisor’s sexual advances constitutes
opposition activity within the meaning of Title VII, however, is an
unsettled question.
34

See 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-3 (2006).
Id.
36
Id.
37
Fine v. Ryan Int’l Airlines, 305 F.3d 746, 752 (7th Cir. 2002).
38
Id. This requirement has both an objective and a subjective component.
Little v. United Tech., Carrier Transicold Div., 103 F.3d 956, 959-60 (11th Cir.
1997) (“A plaintiff must not only show that he subjectively (that is, in good faith)
believed that his employer was engaged in unlawful employment practices but also
that his belief was objectively reasonable in light of the facts and record presented.”).
39
Fine, 305 F.3d at 752 (“[A] plaintiff need not prevail on her Title VII
discrimination claim or have opposed an action that in fact violated Title VII to win
a retaliation claim”).
40
The E.E.O.C.’s Compliance manual provides four examples of opposition
activity: (1) “threatening to file a charge or other formal complaint alleging
discrimination;” (2) “complaining to anyone about alleged discrimination against
oneself or others;” (3) “refusing to obey an order because of a reasonable belief that
it is discriminatory;” and (4) “requesting reasonable accommodation or religious
accommodation.” See EEOC Compliance Manual § 8-II-B(2) (May 20,1998).
41
Durkin v. City of Chicago, 341 F.3d 606, 614 n.4 (7th Cir. 2003).
35
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II. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT
Only the Eighth and Fifth circuit courts of appeal have applied
this statutory and judicial framework to the question of whether the
rejection of a supervisor’s advances constitutes protected activity
under Title VII. This section will examine the relevant facts and
holdings of the Eight Circuit’s decision in Ogden v. Wax Works, Inc. 42
and the Fifth Circuit’s decision in LeMaire v. Louisiana Department of
Transportation & Development. 43
A. Ogden v. Wax Works, Inc.
1. Factual Background
On May 3, 1987 Wax Works Inc. hired Kerry Ogden as the sales
manager of a music store. 44 Ogden reported to a district manager who
performed yearly evaluations of her performance; the evaluations were
required for Ogden to receive her yearly raise. 45 Ogden was an
“outstanding” manager, increased sales of her store, and received
bonuses and awards for her work. 46 Robert Hudson became Ogden’s
district manager in 1993 and Ogden claimed that he began sexually
harassing her in late June or early July, 1994. 47 Ogden detailed three
separate incidents in which Hudson subjected her to unwelcome
physical advances. First, Hudson grabbed her waist while asking her
into his hotel room when the two were leaving a restaurant. 48 Second,
Hudson put his arm around her while intoxicated in a bar with other

42

214 F.3d 999 (8th Cir. 2000).
480 F.3d 383 (5th Cir. 2007).
44
Ogden, 214 F.3d at 1002-03.
45
Id. at 1003.
46
Id.
47
Id.
48
Id.
43
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employees. 49 Third, Hudson again physically grabbed or touched
Hudson. 50 Each time she told Hudson not to touch her and to leave
her alone. 51
Hudson also routinely propositioned Ogden at work 52 and took an
inappropriate interest in her personal life. 53 For example, Hudson
berated her and became angry when learning of any relationship with
male friends outside of work. 54 Whenever Ogden rebuffed Hudson’s
advances, he criticized her work performance and regularly yelled at
her in front of other employees over job related matters. 55 Ogden
believed that Hudson refused to complete her 1995 evaluation, and
therefore refused to give her a raise, in retaliation for her refusal to
give in to his advances. 56 In April, 1995, Hudson’s supervisor ordered
him to perform Ogden’s evaluation. 57 Hudson did not do so, however,
and in June, 1995 he told Ogden he would only perform the evaluation
if she went a three-day gambling spree with him; Ogden refused 58
Hudson responded by yelling at her and then refused her request to
take a vacation. 59

49

Id.
Id.
51
Id. Ogden actually responded to the third incident of harassment with a
physical threat against Hudson. Id.
52
Id. Hudson asked Ogden to drinks after work, to stay with him at his home
and “party,” to go to a motel room with him during a convention, and to attend a
concert with him. Id.
53
Id.
54
Id. Hudson also offered to stay with Ogden to “protect” her from her exhusband.
55
Id.
56
Id. at 1003-04.
57
Id.
58
Id. at 1004. Hudson also told Ogden about affairs he had with other
employees and how he had secured raises and promotions for those employees. He
told Ogden she would not have received a raise in 1994 if it was not for his efforts.
Id.
59
Id.
50
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A later confrontation between Hudson and Ogden in August over
a managerial decision resulted in Hudson following Ogden to her car,
screaming, smacking his fist, and saying he would “squish [her] out
like a little fly.” 60 Ogden called Wax Work’s home office and reported
the incident and that Hudson yelled at her because she would not go
out with him. 61 She eventually told the management office about
Hudson’s conduct, including his offers to stay at his home. 62
Management visited the Sioux City store, but Ogden was unable to
come in to work due to illness. 63 After Wax Works concluded that
Hudson was an asset to the company and would not be fired, the
company terminated Ogden. 64 Ogden never received her 1995 raise
and left Wax Works in September of 1995. 65 During the alleged
harassment, Ogden lost forty pounds, became depressed, and
frequently left work in tears. 66
Ogden brought suit again Wax Works under Title VII for
hostile work environment, quid pro quo sexual harassment, and
retaliation. 67 A jury found in favor of Ogden on all three claims and
Wax Works moved for judgment as a matter of law or in the
alternative, a new trial. 68 The district court denied the motion and Wax
Works appealed. 69

60

Id.
Id. at 1004-05.
62
Id.
63
Id.
64
Id. Management claimed that it fired her because of her allegations against
Hudson.
65
Id.
66
Id.
67
Id. at 1002.
68
Id.
69
Id.
61
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2. The Eight Circuit’s Opinion
The Eight Circuit began its analysis by noting that its review of a
jury verdict would be “extremely deferential”. 70 The court concluded
that Hudson’s numerous physical advances were sufficient to create a
hostile work environment. 71 The court also held that Ogden’s quid pro
quo claim was properly supported by Hudson’s conditioning her 1995
raise on her submission to his unwelcome advances. 72 The court next
found that Wax Work’s investigation was inadequate, and Ogden had
put the employer on notice about the conduct by complaining about
Hudson. 73
Turning to Ogden’s retaliation claim, the Eight Circuit examined
Wax Work’s argument that Ogden failed to engage in “protected
activity” under Title VII. The court held that Ogden “engaged in ‘the
most basic form of protected activity’ when she told her
supervisor. . .to stop his offensive conduct.” 74 The court, quoting the
language of Title VII’s opposition clause, held that a jury could have
reasonably concluded that Ogden opposed discriminatory conduct by
telling her supervisor to stop harassing her. 75 The court further held
that Ogden’s testimony that she opposed discriminatory conduct was
bolstered by the jury’s conclusion that Hudson’s denial of the raise

70

Id. at 1006. The court said it would only overturn a jury verdict if there was
no reasonable interpretation of the evidence that could support Ogden’s position. Id.
71
Id.
72
Id.
73
Id. at 1006-07.
74
Id, at 1007 (quoting Quarles v. McDuffie County, 949 F. Supp. 846, 853
(S.D. Ga. 1996)). In Quarles, an employee told her supervisor, who was verbally and
physically harassing her, that his harassment made her uncomfortable and must stop.
The court held that the employee “engaged in the most basic form of protected
conduct; namely, telling a harasser, who also was serving as her supervisor, to cease
all forms of physical and verbal harassment.” Quarles, 949 F. Supp. at 853.
75
Ogden, 214 F.3d at 1007 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2000)) (citations
omitted).
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was causally connected to Ogden’s opposition to his advances. 76
Finally, the court held that Wax Works retaliated against Ogden for
opposing the discriminatory conduct when Hudson denied her 1995
raise because of Ogden’s opposition. 77 Accordingly, the court upheld
the jury verdict on Ogden’s retaliation claim. 78
B. LeMaire v. Louisiana Department of Transportation &
Development
1. Factual Background
In March 2001 Rene LeMaire started working for the Louisiana
Department of Transportation and Development (“LaDOTD”) as a
bridge operator. 79 Milton Endres and Rodney Jones supervised
LeMaire. 80 In November 2001, LeMarie and a friend ran into Endres
while LeMaire was being dropped off at work. 81 Endres told the two
he had been molested as a child and that he had molested LeMaire’s
friend’s ex-husband when he was a child. 82 Endres also told the men
about his sex life and that he enjoyed being close with other men like
his gay friends, who had been molested. 83 During the exchange,

76

Id. The court also upheld the jury’s verdict on Ogden’s constructive
discharge claim, upheld the jury’s award of front pay damages, and reduced the
jury’s award of punitive damages. Id. at 1007-10.
77
Id. at 1007 n.12.
78
Id. The court also upheld the jury’s verdict on Ogden’s constructive
discharge claim, upheld the jury’s award of front pay damages, and reduced the
jury’s award of punitive damages. Id. at 1007-10.
79
LeMaire v. Louisiana Dep’t of Transp. & Dev., 480 F.3d 383, 385 (5th Cir.
2007). LeMaire’s job “consisted of operating power-driven drawbridges and
performing or overseeing preventative maintenance on the drawbridges.” Id.
80
Id.
81
Id.
82
Id.
83
Id.
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LeMaire repeatedly requested that Endres change the conversation
topic. 84
In February 2002, LeMaire claimed that Endres told him that he
had been with gay men who were having sex at Mardi Gras. 85
LeMaire was upset that he was forced to listen to Endres’ sexual
comments. 86 On June 15, 2002, Endres again spoke to LeMaire about
sexually explicit topics. 87 Endres also told LeMaire told that he would
make it impossible for him to transfer and that his only way to get
away from him was to quit. 88 Endres then ordered LeMaire to spray
herbicide in a particular area by his work station. 89
Spraying herbicide was not outside of LeMarire’s job duties, but
LeMaire believed that the specific order on June 15 was retaliation for
his resistance to Endres’ sexual stories. 90 LeMaire refused to spray the
herbicide, left his job site, and reported the incident and alleged
harassment to Jones, who was also Endres’ supervisor. 91 Jones
convinced LeMaire to file a grievance alleging “unfair/unjust
treatment” instead of a formal sexual harassment complaint. 92
LeMaire received a letter on June 18, 2002 stating that there was no
conclusive evidence of misconduct by Endres. 93 Later, on June 28,
2002, LeMaire was suspended for two days without pay for refusing to
spray herbicide as Endres directed and for leaving the job site without
authorization. 94 LeMaire was then involved in a series of incidents in
which he allegedly slept on the job, arrived late to work, and refused

84

Id.
Id.
86
Id.
87
Id.
88
Id.
89
Id.
90
Id.
91
Id.
92
Id.
93
Id.
94
Id.
85
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an order by Endres to mow grass around a bridge. 95 LeMaire received
a thirty day suspension as a result of those incidents. LaDOTD then
investigated LeMaire’s conduct and eventually fired him on August
15, 2002. 96
LeMaire brought sexual harassment and retaliation claims under
Title VII against LaDOTD. 97 The employer moved for summary
judgment and in a single page order providing no reasons for its
decision, the district court granted the employer’s motion on all
claims. 98 LeMaire appealed.
2. The Fifth Circuit’s Opinion
The Fifth Circuit began its discussion by noting that its review
was complicated by the district court’s lack of analysis and sparse
briefing by the parties. 99 The court then reversed the district court’s
dismissal of the sexual harassment claim because the defendant had
merely denied the existence of the allegedly offensive remarks and
filed a motion citing no legal authority on the issue.100 Turning to
LeMaire’s retaliation claims, the court identified four potential sources
of retaliation. Those sources included (1) Endres’ order to LeMaire to
spray herbicide; 101 (2) other general acts of retaliation by Endres; 102

95

Id.
Id. at 385-86.
97
Id. at 386-87. While it is unclear from the court’s opinion, it appears that
LeMaire filed hostile work environment and quid pro quo sexual harassment claims
against LaDOTD. See id. at 388.
98
Id. at 386-87. The district court stated that “written reasons” for its decision
would be filed at a later date. The district court, however, never filed any reasons for
its decision. Id.
99
Id. at 387.
100
Id. at 387-88 (stating that the defendant “filed a bare-bones motion that
failed to cite to any legal precedent or standards regarding sexual harassment”).
101
Id. at 389.
102
The court did not identify what other “general acts” of retaliation if was
referring to. Id.
96
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(3) LeMaire’s two-day suspension; 103 and (4) LeMaire’s
termination. 104 The court analyzed each potential act of retaliation
separately to determine whether LeMaire could establish a prima facie
case.
With regard to the second allegation of retaliation, the court
reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment on the
miscellaneous allegations because LaDOTD did not move for
summary judgment on those claims. 105 On the third allegation,
LeMaire’s two day suspension, the court noted that facts regarding the
order to spray herbicide, which led to the suspension, were unclear,
and that it was similarly unclear whether Endres was involved in the
decision to suspend LeMaire. The court therefore reversed the district
court’s grant of summary judgment because of the unclear facts
underlying the two-day suspension. 106 On the fourth allegation,
LeMaire’s termination, the court affirmed summary judgment because
LeMaire failed to refute LaDOTD’s legitimate, non-discriminatory
reasons for firing him. 107
With regard to the first allegation, the order to spray herbicide, the
court considered LeMaire’s argument that the order was retaliation for
his rejection of Endres’ sexual advances. 108 The court noted that at the
time of Endres’ order to spray herbicide and LeMaire’s refusal to
follow the order, LeMaire had not yet complained to anyone about the
harassment. 109 Therefore, since LeMaire had not yet complained to
anyone of Endres’ conduct, the only protected activity he could have
engaged in was actually rejecting Endres’ sexual advances. 110 The
103

Id. at 389.
Id. at 389.
105
Id. at 390-91.
106
Id.
107
Id. at 390-91. LaDOTD’s legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for firing
LeMaire included sleeping on the job, being four hours late to work, and refusing to
mow the grass. Id.
108
Id. at 389.
109
Id.
110
Id.
104
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court held that LeMaire had provided no authority “for the proposition
that rejecting sexual advances constitutes a protected activity for
purposes of a retaliation claim under Title VII.” 111 To support its
holding, the Fifth Circuit cited Frank v. Harris County, 112 an
unpublished Fifth Circuit decision that, without citing any authority,
reached the same conclusion. 113 The Fifth Circuit therefore held that
LeMaire’s rejection of Endres’ sexual advances was not a protected
activity under Title VII and affirmed summary judgment for Wax
Works on that issue. 114
III. TATE V. EXECUTIVE MANAGEMENT SERVICES
A. Factual Background
On August 19, 2002, Executive Management Services hired
Alshafi Tate to clean office buildings. 115 Dawn Burban was Tate’s
immediate supervisor and picked him to work under her on a team of
employees to clean buildings. 116 Within approximately one week, the
two began having consensual sex two to three times a week while at
work or at the home of a co-worker. 117 The two continued having sex
throughout his employment, except for a short period in 2003. 118
111

Id..
118 Fed. Appx. 799, 804 (5th Cir. 2004) (unpublished).
113
Id. The court in Frank held that an employee’s rejections of her
supervisor’s sexual advances was not opposition activity because she “provide[ed]
no authority for the proposition that a single ‘express rejection’. . .constitutes as a
matter of law a protected activity for purposes of retaliation.” Id.
114
LeMaire, 480 F.3d at 389, 392. One judge concurred in part and dissented
in part on the basis that he would have affirmed the district court’s entire order of
summary judgment. Id. at 392-96 (DeMoss, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part)
115
Tate v. Executive Mgmt. Serv., Inc., 546 F.3d 528, 529 (7th Cir. 2008),
cert. denied, 129 S.Ct. 1379 (2009).
116
Id. at 529-30.
117
Id. Burban denied that the two ever had a sexual relationship. Id.
118
Id. Tate worked in a different building than Burban for this short time
period. Id.
112
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Based on Burban’s recommendation, EMS promoted Tate after only
one week of work and raised his pay. 119 In August, 2003, Tate got
married. 120 Burban, however, continually called Tate’s home, which
upset his wife. 121 Tate testified that he wanted to “keep the slate clean”
between himself and his wife and tried to end the sexual relationship
with Burban in October, 2003. 122
Burban, however, refused to end the sexual relationship. She
told Tate that she expected the relationship to continue and that he
would lose his job if it did not. 123 In December, 2003, while at a
holiday dinner party with co-workers, Burban told Tate that they must
continue having sex or it would cost him his job. 124 Tate told her that
he did want to continue the relationship. Burban responded by telling
him that he could have a couple days to think about it. 125 Two weeks
later, Burban again asked Tate whether he had “made a choice yet.” 126
It was not clear how Tate responded to that inquiry. On January 13,
2004, Tate arrived to work for an evening shift. 127 Burban summoned
him to her office, closed her door, and asked him if he had made a
decision. Tate said that he had “wasn’t messing with her anymore.” 128
At this point, Burban raised her voice and yelled that Tate did not
“know who [he was] f---king with” and that he “could leave right
now.” 129
When Tate left Burban’s office, she followed him into a break
room, yelling that she would “have [his] job” and was going “to have
119

Id. at 530.
Id.
121
Id.
122
Id. Tate testified that he believed Burban was “was trying to make a hard
choice for me.” Id.
123
Id.
124
Id.
125
Id.
126
Id.
127
Id.
128
Id.
129
Id.
120
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[his] ass fired.” 130 Tate told Burban to call Darren Taylor, Burban’s
supervisor who was not in the office at the time. Burban called Taylor
but did not allow Tate to speak with him. 131 Taylor told Burban to tell
Tate to go home and he was escorted out by a security guard around
4:45 P.M. 132 Burban claimed that she sent Tate home because he
refused, without reason, to go to a new work assignment and became
loud and belligerent. 133 Tate, on the other hand, argued that Burban did
not give him any work-related assignment before he was sent home. 134
Burban then called EMS’s general manager, Nancy Scheumann, and
reported that Tate had refused to do his assigned work and was sent
home. Burban subsequently prepared an “insubordination” report for
Tate. 135
The following day, Scheumann had made the decision to fire Tate
by 8:50 a.m. 136 EMS claimed that Scheumann’s decision to fire Tate
was based on Tate’s employment record and conversations with
Burban, Taylor, and the security officer. 137 Tate tried to call
Scheumann and Taylor that day to discuss the incident. He contacted
130

Id.
Id.
132
Id. The security guard heard Burban and Taylor arguing and heard Burban
tell Taylor “If you can’t do what I tell you to do, just leave.” Id. See Brief of
Plaintiff-Appellee, Tate v. Executive Mgmt. Serv., Inc., 546 F.3d 528 (7th Cir.
2008), cert. denied, 129 S.Ct. 1379 (2009), 2008 WL 401044 (stating that the
security guard approached Tate and Burban around 4:45 P.M).
133
Tate, 546 F.3d at 530-31.
134
Id.
135
Id. Burban wrote that Tate said cleaning a particular building was not part
of his job, that he only needed to complete certain tasks that would not have taken
eight hours to complete, and that Burban told him he needed to complete eight hours
of work. Burban further wrote that she told Tate to go home after he continued to
refuse the do the work, and that a security guard heard the argument and escorted
Tate out of the building. Id.
136
Id. at 531.
137
Id. The security officer, however, testified that he did not speak to
Scheumann until approximately one month after the incident. Scheumann also
testified that an investigation was not warranted because of Tate’s alleged
insubordination. Id.
131
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EMS’s corporate headquarters and reached a human resources official
who told him that he had been terminated for insubordination. 138 Tate
asked if he could explain his side of the story but was not given an
opportunity to do so and the conversation lasted less than one
minute. 139 Burban singed Tate’s termination form. 140
Tate brought harassment and retaliation claims against EMS.141
The jury found against Tate on his sexual harassment claim but
returned a verdict in his favor on the retaliation claim. 142 EMS
renewed its previous motion for judgment as a matter of law or in the
alternative, a new trial. 143 EMS argued that it had no knowledge of
Burban’s retaliatory motive and discharged Tate based on the report of
the security officer, a neutral and disinterested witness. EMS also
argued that Tate did not engage in a protected activity when he told
Burban he would not have sex with her to keep his job. 144
B. The District Court’s Opinion
Addressing EMS’s post-trial motion, the district court began by
examining the language of the opposition clause of Title VII’s
retaliation provision. 145 The court stated that threatening a person with
termination if he or she refuses to continue a sexual relationship is an
unlawful employment practice. 146 The court held that based on Title
VII’s language, a “straightforward reading of the statute’s text requires
138

Id.
Id.
140
Id.
141
Id.
142
Id. Curiously, the jury awarded Tate no compensatory damages on his
retaliation claim. Tate v. Executive Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 2007 WL 1650410 (N.D.
Ind. 2007), overruled by Tate v. Executive Mgmt. Servs, Inc., 546 F.3d 528 (7th Cir.
2008), cert. denied, 2009 WL 62165 (U.S. 2009).
143
Tate, 546 F.3d at 531.
144
Id.
145
See Tate, 2007 WL 1650410 at *2 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2006)).
146
Id. (citing Mary M. v. N. Lawrence Cmty. Sch. Corp., 131 F.3d 1220, 1226
n. 7 (7th Cir. 1997)).
139
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finding that rebuffing sexual harassment can in some situations be
considered opposition to an unlawful employment practice.” 147
Further, the court held that when an employee refuses a supervisor’s
ultimatum to continue having a sexual relationship or else be
terminated, the employee could reasonably be opposing the sexual
relationship or change in the terms of employment. 148 In this case, the
court found that Tate refused Burban’s ultimatum to have sex, but did
so under the threat of termination. 149
The court then addressed the concerns of other courts holding that
rebuffing a supervisor’s sexual advances is not opposition activity.
First, the court rejected the argument that rebuffing sexual advances
cannot constitute a form of protected activity because if it did, every
harassment claim would automatically include a retaliation claim 150
The court reasoned that when an employee is fired for saying no to a
supervisor’s ultimatum to continue having sex or end employment, the
reason for firing could be the employee’s opposition to the change in
employment terms, the sexual harassment, or both. 151 The court found
that the reasons for an employee’s opposition in this situation, while
intertwined, are not identical and represent separate claims—one for
harassment (opposing the sexual relationship) and another for
retaliation (opposing the change in employment terms now condition
upon acquiescence to the harassment). 152 The court therefore
dismissed the concern that every harassment claim would
automatically state a retaliation claim. Second, the court rejected the
concern that a retaliation claim in this situation is duplicative and
might confuse a jury, reasoning that those hypothetical concerns were

147

Id.
Id.
149
Id.
150
See id. (citing Del Castillo v. Pathmark Stores, Inc., 941 F. Supp. 437, 43839 (S.D. N.Y. 1996).
151
Id.
152
Id.
148
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not sufficient to ignore the plain language of Title VII’s retaliation
provision. 153
Thus, the court found that it was reasonable for the jury to
conclude that Tate was fired for opposing the unlawful practice of
making employment contingent on sex. 154 Accordingly, the court
denied EMS’s motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and
for a new trial. 155 EMS appealed.
C. The Seventh Circuit’s Opinion
The Seventh Circuit turned directly to the issue of whether Tate
engaged in a protected activity under Title VII. 156 After quoting Title
VII’s retaliation provision, the court recognized the circuit split
between the Eighth and Fifth Circuits. 157 The court declined to decide
the issue but was willing to assume that there may be situations in
which a plaintiff who rejects his supervisor’s advances has engaged in
a protected activity. 158 The court held that even under this assumption,
Tate did not engage in a protected activity because he did not
reasonably believe that he opposed an unlawful employment
practice. 159
The court focused its analysis on the requirement that a plaintiff
must have subjectively believed they were opposing an unlawful
employment practice. 160 The court cited precedent in which employees
demonstrated their belief that they were being harassed by
153

See id. (examining Rashid v. Beth Israel Med. Cent., 1998 WL 689931, *2
(S.D.N.Y.1998)).
154
Id. at *2-3. The court also concluded that there was a sufficient basis for
employer liability because Scheumann acted as Burban’s “rubber stamp” in firing
Tate, there was no independent investigation, and Tate was prevented from telling
his side of the story. Id. at *3-4.
155
Id. at *4-5.
156
Tate, 546 F.3d at 532.
157
Id.
158
Id.
159
Id. (citing Fine v. Ryan Int’l Airlines, 305 F.3d 746, 752 (7th Cir. 2002)).
160
Id.
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complaining directly to management or threatening to go the EEOC
with complaints. 161 The court then examined several statements from
Tate that it considered particularly important to the issue of whether he
believed he was being harassed. 162 First, when Bourban gave him the
final ultimatum, he told her they “were not good with each other” and
that he “was not messing with her anymore.” 163 Second, if Tate would
have had an opportunity to explain his story to upper level
management, he would have said that he was not insubordinate and
was “wrongly mistreated.” 164 Third, Tate said he would have liked
management to know that Burban had called his home and had an
argument with his wife. 165 Finally, Tate testified that he “wanted to
leave Dawn” so that he could “start off with a clean slate” and “be
true” to his wife. 166
The court found that while there was no doubt that Tate protested
Burban’s actions, his statements indicated personal reasons for ending
the sexual relationship, rather than a belief that he was being
harassed. 167 In fact, the court found the record “devoid” of any
statements proving that Tate believed he was opposing an unlawful
employment practice. 168 The court reasoned that protecting an
employee who did not believe he was being harassed would not serve
the purpose of the reasonable good faith requirement. 169 Finding that
161

Id. (citing Dey v. Colt Constr. & Dev. Co., 28 F.3d 1446, 1450 (7th Cir.
1994), and Holland v. Jefferson Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 883 F.2d 1307, 1315 (7th Cir.
1989)).
162
Id. at 532-33.
163
Id.
164
Id. at 533.
165
Id.
166
Id.
167
Id. (holding that Tate’s “statements point to personal reasons for ending the
relationship rather than concerns about the legality of Burban's behavior.”).
168
Id.
169
Id. (citing Mattson v. Caterpillar, Inc., 359 F.3d 885, 891 (7th Cir.2004)
(“The purpose of requiring that plaintiffs reasonably believe in good faith that they
have suffered discrimination is clear. Title VII was designed to protect the rights of
employees who in good faith protest the discrimination they believe they have
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Tate did not in oppose what he believed was harassment, the court
held that he had not engaged in a protected activity. 170 Accordingly,
the Seventh Circuit reversed the district court’s ruling and held that
EMS was entitled to judgment as a matter of law on Tate’s retaliation
claim. 171
IV. THE LANGUAGE OF TITLE VII: DEFINING OPPOSED
The Seventh Circuit’s decision in Tate did not focus on the
definition of oppose. 172 However, the ultimate result of the case, that
an employee who rebuffed his superior’s demands for sex did not
oppose an unlawful employment activity, creates precedent that affects
how opposed will be defined in this situation. Holdings like the
Seventh Circuit’s in Tate that an employee who rejects his supervisor’s
demands for sex did not oppose an unlawful employment practice run
counter to the definition of oppose. This section will show how an
employee who rebuffs a supervisor demands for sex satisfies the
retaliation clause’s opposition requirement by examining (A) the plain
language of Title VII; (B) the retaliation clause’s legislative history;
and (C) the Supreme Court’s recent interpretation of the retaliation
clause in Crawford v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville and
Davidson County, Tenn. 173
A. The Plain Language of Title VII
The first step in any form of statutory interpretation is to examine
the plain language of a statute.174 The opposition clause of Title VII’s
suffered and to ensure that such employees remain free from reprisals or retaliatory
conduct.”) (emphasis added by the court)).
170
Id.
171
Id.
172
The court in Tate focused on the requirement that an employee have a good
faith reasonable belief that they are opposing unlawful discrimination. Id.
173
129 S.Ct. 846 (2009).
174
See Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 98 (2003) (holding that “[o]ur
precedents make clear that the starting point for. . .analysis is the statutory text” and
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retaliation provision states that an employer may not retaliate against
an employee who “has opposed any practice made an unlawful
employment practice by” Title VII. 175 Sexual harassment, whether
hostile work environment or quid pro quo harassment, is an unlawful
employment practice. 176 Since a supervisor’s sexual advances are an
unlawful employment practice, it follows that refusing to submit to
those advances or verbally objecting to them is a method of opposing
the unlawful employment practice. In fact, many district courts have
followed this exact method of analysis in holding that rebuffing a
supervisor’s sexual advances is opposition activity under Title VII’s
retaliation clause. 177 Still, Title VII’s plain language does not define
opposed or make its definition clear.
B. Legislative History
The legislative history behind the retaliation provision offers no
guidance on how to interpret or apply it, or even why it was added to
Title VII. The committee reports simply repeat the retaliation
provision’s language without any explanation for its meaning. 178 The
that “where. . .the words of the statute are unambiguous, the ‘judicial inquiry is
complete.’”) (quoting Connecticut Nat.’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253-254,
(1992)).
175
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2006).
176
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2006); supra notes 22-23 and
accompanying text.
177
Little v. NBC, 210 F. Supp. 2d 330, 385-86 (S.D. N.Y. 2002) (holding that
“sexual harassment by an employer or supervisor is an unlawful practice, and an
employee's refusal is a means of opposing such unlawful conduct”); Fleming v.
South Carolina Dep’t of Corr., 952 F. Supp. 283, 288 (D. S.C. 1996) (holding that
the employer’s “alleged conduct of requesting sex from the plaintiff is an unlawful
practice and the plaintiff’s refusal is opposition to such unlawful conduct”); See also
Ogden v. Wax Works, Inc. 214 F.3d 999, 1007 (8th Cir. 2000) (using similar
reasoning).
178
See Edward C. Waltershied, A Question of Retaliation: Opposition Conduct
As Protected Expression Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 29 BOSTON
C. L. REV. 391, 393-94 (1988) (examining the committee reports). The proceedings
and floor debates concerning the retaliation clause also reveal nothing about its
purpose or intended application. See Hochstadt v. Worcester Found. for

317
Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2009

27

Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 4, Iss. 2 [2009], Art. 4

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Volume 4, Issue 2

Spring 2009

only statement of congressional intent related to the provision occurs
in the statement that “management prerogatives. . .are to be left
undisturbed to the greatest extent possible. Internal affairs of
employers. . .must not be interfered with except to the limited extent
that correction is required in discrimination practices.” 179 The rest of
the history surrounding Title VII is similarly unhelpful. 180 Courts,
therefore, have been left to interpret the meaning of the retaliation
clause and have traditionally relied on its plain language. This reliance
makes sense, especially given that at the time of every previous
decision on the issue of what constitutes opposition activity for
purposes of retaliation, the Supreme Court had never offered guidance
on the meaning of opposed. In its recent decision in Crawford v.
Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County,
Tennessee however, the Supreme Court, for the first time, discussed
the meaning of opposed. 181
C. Crawford v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson
County, Tennessee
1. Factual Background
The plaintiff in Crawford was asked by her employer’s human
resources department, as part of an ongoing investigation into rumors
Experimental Biology, 545 F.2d 222, 230 (1st Cir. 1976) (“Neither in its wording
nor legislative history does section 704(a) make plain how far Congress meant to
immunize hostile and disruptive employee activity when it declared it unlawful for
an employer to discriminate against an employee ‘because he has opposed any
practice made an unlawful employment practice by this subchapter . . . .’ 42 U.S.C. s
2000e-3(a). The statute says no more, and the committee reports on the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 and the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1963, which later
became Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, repeat the language of 704(a) without any
explanation.”)
179
See Waltershied, supra note 178, at 393.
180
Title VII’s legislative history has been declared “judicially
incomprehensible.” Beverly v. Lone Star Lead Constr. Corp., 437 F.2d 1136, 1138
n.7 (5th Cir. 1971).
181
129 S.Ct. 846 (2009).
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of sexual harassment by a supervisor, if she had ever witnessed
inappropriate behavior by the supervisor. 182 The plaintiff reported
several instances of inappropriate sexual behavior by the supervisor
and two other employees gave similar reports. 183 The employer took
no action against the supervisor and fired all three accusers after the
investigation was complete. 184 The employee filed suit, claiming the
she was fired in retaliation for reporting the supervisor’s conduct, in
violation the opposition and participation clauses of Title VII’s
retaliation provision. 185
The district court granted summary judgment for the employer,
finding that simply answering questions by investigators in an already
ongoing internal investigation initiated by another employee was not
opposition activity under Title VII. 186 The court also found that
participation in the investigation did not fit under Title VII’s
participation clause because it was not done pursuant to a pending
EEOC charge. 187 The Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that Title VII’s
opposition clause “demands active, consistent ‘opposing’ activities to
warrant. . .protection against retaliation.” 188 The court held that
answering questions in an investigation started by someone else and
then not taking any other action after the investigation, such as filing
an EEOC charge, was not the type of “overt opposition” that Title VII
protects. 189 The court also concluded that since the investigation was
not conducted due to a pending EEOC charge, there was no violation
of the participation clause. 190 The plaintiff appealed and the Supreme
182

Id. at 849.
Id.
184
Id. The employer claimed it had fired the plaintiff for embezzlement.
185
Id. at 850.
186
Id.
187
Id.
188
Crawford v. Metropolitan Gov’t of Nashville, 211 Fed.Appx. 373, *2-3 (6th
Cir. 2006) (quoting Bell v. Safety Grooving and Grinding, LP, 107 Fed. App’x. 607,
610 (6th Cir. 2004)), overruled by Crawford, 129 S.Ct. at 846.
189
Id. at *3.
190
Id. at *3-4.
183
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Court granted certiorari to answer the question of whether an
employee who speaks out about harassment not on her own initiative,
but in answering questions during an employer’s internal investigation
has opposed an unlawful employment practice under Title VII. 191
2. The Majority Opinion
The Supreme Court unanimously reversed the Sixth Circuit’s
decision and held that an employee who speaks out about
discrimination during an employer’s investigation is protected by Title
VII’s retaliation provision. 192 The Court held that since Title VII does
not define oppose, the word retains its ordinary meaning. 193
Examining dictionary definitions of the word, the Court held that
oppose means “‘to resist or antagonize. . .; to contend against; to
confront; resist; withstand” and that although those definitions implied
affirmative acts, “‘resist frequently implies more active striving than
oppose.’” 194 In dicta, the court noted that oppose is also defined as “to
be hostile or adverse to, as in opinion.” 195 The Court also cited the
EEOC Compliance manual, which defines opposition as
communicating a belief to an employer that it has engaged in
employment discrimination. 196
Under these definitions, the Court held that the plaintiff’s
statement to her employer about the supervisor was covered by the
191

Crawford, 129 S.Ct. at 849.
Id.
193
Id. at 850 (citing Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 42 (1979)).
194
Id. (quoting Webster's New International Dictionary 1710 (2d ed. 1958))
(emphasis in original).
195
Id. (quoting Random House Dictionary of the English Language 1359 (2d
ed.1987)).
196
Id. at 850-51 (“‘When an employee communicates to her employer a belief
that the employer has engaged in . . . a form of employment discrimination, that
communication’ virtually always ‘constitutes the employee’s opposition to the
activity.’”) (quoting Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae, Crawford v.
Metropolitan Gov’t of Nashville and Davidson County, Tenn. 129 S.Ct. 846 (2009)
(citing 2 EEOC Compliance Manual §§ 8-II-B(1)-(2) (Mar. 2003))).
192
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opposition clause because it was “an ostensibly disapproving account”
of harassment that caused her employer to fire her. 197 The Court also
held that the plaintiff’s descriptions of the supervisor’s inappropriate
sexual behavior would “certainly qualify in the minds of reasonable
jurors” as resistant, antagonistic or antagonistic to the supervisor’s
harassment.” 198 Further, the Court expressly rejected the Sixth
Circuit’s requirement that opposition requires active behavior or the
instigating of a complaint to be protected. 199 In dicta, the Court stated
that “‘[o]ppose’ goes beyond ‘active, consistent’ behavior in ordinary
discourse, where we would naturally use the word to speak of
someone who has taken no action at all to advance a position beyond
disclosing it.” 200 The Court provided examples of this type of silent
opposition, such as opposing slavery before Emancipation, opposing
capital punishment without writing letters or protesting, and an
employee who simply maintains the status quo and refuses to
implement an employer’s discriminatory policy. 201
The Court also rejected the argument that if retaliation is an easier
claim for an employee to make, employers will be discouraged from
investigating discrimination. 202 Finally, the Court found its holding
consistent with the primary objective of the retaliation clause, which is
to avoid harm to employees. 203 The Court therefore concluded that the
197

Id.
Id. at 851. The Court also noted that it was not unclear whether the
employee opposed the supervisor’s actions because she “gave no indication that [his]
gross clowning was anything but offensive to her.” Id. at n.2.
199
Id. at 851 (holding that “though these requirements obviously exemplify
opposition as commonly understood, they are not limits of it”).
200
Id.
201
Id.
202
Id. at 851-52. The Court held that employers have a strong incentive to
inquire about and remedy any potential workplace discrimination and that a broader
interpretation of “oppose” posed no threat to that incentive. Id.
203
Id. at 852. (“If it were clear law that an employee who reported
discrimination in answering an employer’s questions could be penalized with no
remedy, prudent employees would have a good reason to keep quiet about Title VII
offenses against themselves or against others.”).
198
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employee’s conduct in answering questions in an internal investigation
was opposition activity. 204 Accordingly, the Court reversed the Sixth
Circuit’s decision. 205
3. Justice Alito’s Concurring Opinion
Justices Alito wrote a separate concurring opinion in which
Justice Thomas joined to express his understanding that the Court’s
holding did not and would not extend beyond employees who testify
in internal investigations or similar “purposive” conduct. 206 Justice
Alito noted that while not all conduct must be active or consistent, the
primary definitions of the term oppose require conduct that is “active
and purposive.” 207 Justice Alito approved of the definition of opposed
advanced by the plaintiff, 208 but believed the Court should not expand
its definition any further. Specifically, Justice Alito took issue with the
Court’s citation to the definition of oppose as in “‘to be hostile or
adverse to, as in opinion,’” 209 which he believed could include silent
opposition. 210

204

Id. at 852-53. (“[N]othing in the statute requires a freakish rule protecting
an employee who reports discrimination on her own initiative but not one who
reports the same discrimination in the same words when her boss asks a question.”).
205
Id. at 852-53. The Court did not reach the employee’s participation clause
argument. Id. at 853.
206
Id. at 853-55 (Alito, J. concurring).
207
Id. (“For example, the first three definitions of the term in the dictionary
upon which the Court principally relies are as follows: ‘1. to act against or provide
resistance to; combat. 2. to stand in the way of; hinder; obstruct. 3. to set as an
opponent or adversary.’”) (quoting Random Dict. 1359 (2d ed.1987)).
208
The plaintiff argued, and Justice Alito agreed, that oppose means “‘taking
action (including making a statement) to end, prevent, redress, or correct unlawful
discrimination.’” Id. at 854 (quoting Brief for Petitioner, Crawford v. Metropolitan
Gov’t of Nashville and Davidson County, Tenn. 129 S.Ct. 846 (2009)).
209
Id. at 854 (emphasis added by the Court).
210
Id.
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Justice Alito doubted whether silent opposition is covered by Title
VII. In particular, he noted that all of the other conduct protected in
the retaliation clause, such as making a charge, testifying, or assisting
or participating in an investigation, requires active or purposive
conduct. 212 He went on to say that protecting conduct that is not active
could have the negative consequence of allowing employees to
recover on retaliation claims without expressing “a word of opposition
to their employers.” 213 Additionally, he noted that with the recent
increase in the number of retaliation claims filed at the EEOC, an
expansive interpretation of the opposition clause could spur the filing
of even more claims. 214 Finally, Justice Alito made clear that the
question of whether the opposition clause protected employees who do
not communicate their opposition to their employer was not before the
Court and that the answer to this question was “far from clear.” 215
211

4. Crawford’s Application
The Supreme Court in Crawford did not decide whether the
opposition clause protects an employee who rebuffs his supervisor’s
sexual advances. 216 The Court’s statutory construction and discussion
of the meaning of oppose, however, indicates that such conduct
constitutes opposition conduct within Title VII’s meaning. First, the
activity of saying “no” to an ultimatum for continued sex or
termination fits the Court’s definition of opposed. 217 Verbally saying
211

Id. (“While this is certainly an accepted usage of the term ‘oppose,’ the
term is not always used in this sense[.]”).
212
Id. Justice Alito believed that this weighed in favor of interpreting those
shared traits of active or purposive conduct to other items in the statute, such as the
word opposed. See id.
213
Id.
214
Id. at 854-55.
215
Id. at 855.
216
See id. at 852-53.
217
Including rebuffing a supervisor’s advances within the definition of
opposed would be a new extension of the definition for the Supreme Court and it is
not a perfect fit. The Court’s language about the definition of opposed, however,
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no to this type of demand, especially when it is repeated, qualifies as
having resisted, withstood, or antagonized an unlawful employment
practice. 218 The Court also defined opposed as having been hostile or
adverse to, “as in opinion.” 219 While this language was dicta, it is
instructive. Turning down sexual advances, especially in the face of a
threat to be fired, is activity or an opinion that is hostile or adverse to
the harassment, thus fitting this definition as well. 220 Further, saying
no to a supervisor in this situation qualifies as having communicated a
belief to the employer that his activity is harassment, a definition
unanimously accepted by the Court. 221
Second, an employee’s rebuff of a supervisor’s threat shows
disapproval of the supervisor’s actions and may often provoke the
supervisor to inflict some sort of payback. 222 This scenario fits
squarely within the Supreme Court’s holding that the employee in
Crawford opposed an unlawful employment practice because she
made “an ostensibly disapproving account of sexually obnoxious
behavior” that led to her termination. 223 Telling a supervisor “no
more” is ostensible disapproving behavior that can lead to
termination. 224 Further, although dicta, the Court gave several
examples of silent opposition that could constitute opposition within
the meaning of Title VII. 225 Like the employee who silently refuses to
indicates that it would be proper to include this type of activity as opposition
activity. See infra notes 218-219, 221 and accompanying text.
218
See supra note 194 and accompanying text.
219
See supra note 195 and accompanying text.
220
See id.
221
See supra note 196 and accompanying text.
222
This is exactly what happened to the employee who was fired in Tate and
the employee who was denied a raise and ultimately fired in Ogden. See Tate v.
Executive Mgmt. Serv., Inc., 546 F.3d 528, 529-31 (7th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129
S.Ct. 1379 (2009); Ogden v. Wax Works, Inc., 214 F.3d 999, 1003-04 (8th Cir.
2000).
223
Crawford, 129 S.Ct. at 850.
224
See supra note 221.
225
Crawford, 129 S.Ct. at 851. For example, opposing slavery before
Emancipation, opposing capital punishment without writing letters or protesting, and
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implement an employer’s discriminatory policy, an employee who
rebuffs a supervisor’s sexual advances silently refuses to participate in
unlawful conduct. 226 In fact, when an employee actively rebuffs a
supervisor in this situation by saying “no,” the employee goes farther
than the Supreme Court’s examples.
This illustrates the third reason why an employee’s actions in this
situation fit within Crawford’s and Title VII’s meaning of
opposition—saying “no” is not silent opposition. While Justice Alito
doubted that the opposition clause could protect silent opposition,
actively saying “no” and refusing to participate in harassment is
distinguishable from silent opposition. 227 Further, even if an
employee’s actions in this situation were construed to be silent
opposition, such opposition, so long as it is in response to an unlawful
employment practice, may still constitute protected activity under Title
VII. 228 Thus, the Supreme Court’s decision in Crawford shows that a
proper reading of the opposition clause’s statutory language would
include protecting an employee who actively and purposefully rebuffs
a supervisor’s sexual advances.
V. BEYOND TITLE VII’S LANGUAGE
Several important policy and practical considerations further
support reading the opposition clause to protect an employee who
rebuffs her supervisor’s sexual advances. This section will examine
these considerations by discussing (a) the importance of the

an employee who simply maintain he status quo and refuses to implement an
employer’s discriminatory policy, would all quality. Id.
226
See id.
227
See id. at 853-55 (Alito, J. concurring). Additionally, while an employee
who has simply stated, “no,” has not initiated an EEOC complaint or participated in
an internal investigation, the Supreme Court’s majority opinion expressly rejects the
notion that the opposition clause requires participation in an investigation. See id. at
851.
228
See McDonnell v. Cisneros, 84 F.3d 256, 262 (7th Cir. 1996) (“Passive
resistance is a time-honored form of opposition[.]”).
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supervisor-employee relationship, (b) the purpose and policy of the
retaliation provision, and (c) other practical considerations.
A. The Importance of the Supervisor – Employee Relationship
The supervisor to employee relationship has been a dominant
theme in employment law. In fact, employer liability for harassment
turns almost exclusively on whether the harasser is by an employee’s
supervisor or a coworker. 229 Harassment by a supervisor triggers strict
liability for an employer whereas harassment by a mere co-worker
triggers liability only if the employer was negligent in discovering or
remedying the harassment. 230 A supervisor is an employee with the
power to directly affect the terms and conditions of a person’s
employment. 231 The focus in determining whether an employee is a
supervisor is on the power and authority the supervisor has over
another employee. 232 A supervisor generally has the power to hire,
fire, demote, promote, transfer, or discipline an employee. 233
The reasons for the distinction between a co-worker and a
supervisor and the focus on the power of the supervisor over the
employee are important. The Supreme Court discussed these reasons
when it established the supervisor basis for employer liability in
Faragher v. City of Boca Raton. 234 In Faragher, the Court noted that a
supervisor’s role gives the supervisor increased opportunity for contact
and access to an employee. 235 Since the supervisor has the power to
alter the employee’s terms and conditions of employment, the
229

Rhodes v. Ill. Dep’t of Transp., 359 F.3d 498, 505-06 (7th Cir.2004).
Id.
231
Id. at 506 (“‘Supervisor’” is a legal term of art for Title VII purposes, and
an employee merely having authority to oversee aspects of another employee’s job
performance does not qualify as a supervisor in the Title VII context.”).
232
Parkins v. Civil Constr. of Ill., Inc., 163 F.3d 1027, 1033-34 (7th Cir.1998)
(“the question. . .is how much or what kind of authority must an individual possess
to be a true supervisor”).
233
Id. at 1033 n.1.
234
524 U.S. 775, 803 (1998).
235
Id.
230
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employee may be less likely to risk complaining about a supervisor. 236
Further, an employee must interact with their supervisor and cannot
simply find a way to avoid the harasser in the same way that a mere
co-worker can be avoided. The Court found:
When a fellow employee harasses, the victim can walk away or
tell the offender where to go, but it may be difficult to offer such
responses to a supervisor, whose “power to supervise-[which may
be] to hire and fire, and to set work schedules and pay rates-does
not disappear 237
Additionally, the Court noted that imposing liability based on a
supervisory relationship encourages employers to prevent
discrimination because they have a greater opportunity to control the
actions of their managers. 238 The Supreme Court’s emphasis on the
inequality of power between a supervisor and employee is relevant to
a consideration of a supervisor’s sexual advances in the retaliation
context because the power relationship is the same. An employee who
is propositioned by her supervisor cannot merely walk away like she
could with a fellow employer. 239 Further, a subordinate employee
harassed by a supervisor will be more hesitant to complain about the
supervisor than a fellow employee. 240 The employee’s first line of
defense against a harassing supervisor is the rejection of the
236

Id.
Id.
238
Id. (“Recognition of employer liability when discriminatory misuse of
supervisory authority alters the terms and conditions of a victim's employment is
underscored by the fact that the employer has a greater opportunity to guard against
misconduct by supervisors than by common workers; employers have greater
opportunity and incentive to screen them, train them, and monitor their
performance.”).
239
See supra note 237 and accompanying text. Indeed, the plaintiff in Tate
attempted to walk away but was called into his supervisor’s office. See Tate v.
Executive Mgmt. Serv., Inc., 546 F.3d 528, 530 (7th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129
S.Ct. 1379 (2009).
240
See supra note 236 and accompanying text.
237
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supervisor’s advances. Given the inequality of power between a
supervisor and employee in this situation and employment law’s
traditional focus on this relationship, the existence of a supervisor to
employee relationship weighs in favor of protecting an employee from
retaliation when they rebuff a supervisor’s advances. 241 Additionally,
the supervisor, with his power to change the terms and conditions of
employment, stands in for the employer as its agent. 242 When an
employee tells a supervisor that his harassment must cease, the
employee therefore also puts the employer on notice about the
harassment.
B. The Purpose and Policy of the Retaliation Provision
The purpose of Title VII’s retaliation provision in relation to the
purposes of Title VII provides important guidance on how it should be
interpreted and applied. 243 First, as the purpose of Title VII is to
provide substantive guarantees to create a workplace free of
discrimination, 244 the retaliation provision’s “primary purpose” is
provide employees with “unfettered access to [Title VII’s] statutory
remedial mechanisms.” 245 In order for Title VII’s protections from
workplace discrimination to work, employees must feel free to stand

241

See also Holly D. v. California Inst. of Tech., 339 F.3d 1158, 1174-75 (9th
Cir. 2003) (holding because of “the imbalance of power, persistent unwanted sexual
attention from a supervisor has the potential to result in significant harm. A
supervisor may find love or companionship with one he oversees, but he may not use
his position to extort sexual favors from an unwilling employee”).
242
See generally Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 803 (1998);
Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 72 (“Congress wanted courts to
look to agency principles for guidance in this area.”).
243
See Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 54
(2006) (“purpose reinforces what [the retaliation provision’s] language says”).
244
See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 800-801 (1973).
245
Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 346, (1997); Burlington Northern,
548 U.S. at 63 (“The substantive provision seeks to prevent injury to individuals
based on who they are, i.e., their status. The anti-retaliation provision seeks to
prevent harm to individuals based on what they do, i.e., their conduct.”).
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up and complain when they feel their rights have been violated. 246 By
prohibiting retaliation against employees attempting to enforce those
rights, the retaliation provision provides employees with the practical
protection necessary to guarantee access to Title VII’s substantive
guarantees. 247 Protecting employees who say “no” when harassed by a
supervisor encourages employees to stand up for their rights and helps
guarantee the enforcement of Title VII’s prohibition on sexual
harassment the workplace.
Second, the Supreme Court has interpreted Title VII to support a
policy that encourages employees to use informal methods to speak
out against discrimination and also encourages employers to prevent
and correct harassment. Under the Supreme Court’s companion
decisions in Burlington Industries v. Ellerth 248 and Faragher v. City of
Boca Raton, 249 an employer may plead an affirmative defense that it
had “exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any
sexually harassing behavior” and that the employee “unreasonably
failed to take advantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities
provided by the employer[.]” 250 This affirmative defense is only
available, however, when an employer has not taken any adverse
employment action against an employee. 251 This standard of employer
liability was adopted in order to encourage employees to speak out
against harassment and take advantage of an employer’s procedures
for harassment claims. 252 By encouraging employees to report
246

Burlington Northern, 548 U.S. at 67 (“Title VII depends for its enforcement
upon the cooperation of employees who are willing to file complaints and act as
witnesses.”).
247
Id. at 63 (“The anti-retaliation provision seeks to secure [Title VII’s]
primary objective by preventing an employer from interfering (through retaliation)
with an employee’s efforts to secure or advance enforcement of the Act’s basic
guarantees.”)
248
524 U.S. 742 (1998).
249
524 U.S. 775 (1998).
250
Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807-08.
251
Id. at 808.
252
See Burlington Indus., 524 U.S. at 764 (“Title VII is designed to encourage
the creation of antiharassment policies and effective grievance mechanisms. Were
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harassment, employers have a greater opportunity to prevent and
correct harassment, thus avoiding litigation. The effect of the Supreme
Court’s incentive for employees to speak out against harassment has
the inverse result of exposing employees to additional opportunities
for retaliation. 253 The opposition clause supports these policies by
protecting employees in this situation 254 and should similarly protect
an employee who, following the Supreme Court’s incentive to speak
out and resolve problems early, voices opposition to harassment to her
supervisor. 255
Third, Title VII’s policy in favor of encouraging employees to
speak out against unlawful discrimination explains the existence of the
reasonable good faith belief requirement. Without the ability of an
employee to sue for retaliation regardless of whether their employer
actually broke the law, 256 employees would be forced to file formal
charges or lawsuits when an informal complaint might suffice to end
the harassment. 257 Employees also might run the risk of retaliation
employer liability to depend in part on an employer’s effort to create such
procedures, it would effect Congress’ intention to promote conciliation rather than
litigation in the Title VII context,. . .and the EEOC's policy of encouraging the
development of grievance procedures. . . . To the extent limiting employer liability
could encourage employees to report harassing conduct before it becomes severe or
pervasive, it would also serve Title VII's deterrent purpose.”); George, supra note
17, at 443 (“[L]iability assessments under harassment law create a legal incentive for
an employee to report quickly to the employer behavior that might constitute a
violation of the employer’s sexual harassment policy[.]”).
253
See generally George, supra note 17 (discussing problems with the early
reporting incentive).
254
See 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-3 (2006).
255
Telling a supervisor “no” also provides the employer with an immediate
opportunity to correct its behavior and prevent formal charges or litigation.
256
See Little v. United Technologies, Carrier Transicold Div., 103 F.3d 956,
959-60 (11th Cir. 1997).
257
See Deborah L. Brake, Retaliation, 90 MINN. L. REV. 18, 77-78 (2005)
(“The opposition clause extends protection from retaliation to persons who complain
informally of discrimination, stopping short of invoking the formal legal machinery
of Title VII. Such protection is essential to support Title VII policies favoring the
prevention of discrimination and the early, informal resolution of complaints.
Charges of discrimination rarely reach the EEOC or the courts without some higher-
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from their employer with no effective redress if their interpretation of
the law turned out to be incorrect. 258 This would create a chilling
effect that would discourage employees from asserting their civil
rights and undermine the enforcement of Title VII. 259 A similar
chilling effect would be created if employees were not protected from
retaliation when telling a supervisor to stop what the employee feels is
harassment.
The retaliation provision should be construed in accordance with
these underlying purposes, which support protecting an employee who
rebuffs her supervisor’s sexual advances. The Supreme Court has even
recently recognized the importance of broadly interpreting the
provision in accordance with its purposes. 260 Furthermore, an effective
retaliation provision is so important to the effectiveness of an antidiscrimination statute that courts have implied retaliation protection
for informal complaints in other federal statutes. 261 Thus, the purposes
level person first learning of the complainant's concerns. Without protection from
retaliation at the early, less formal stages of complaining, challengers would be
chilled from ever complaining or be forced into taking formal legal action when
informal action might have been a more appropriate response, at least initially.”)
(citations omitted).
258
See supra note 256 and accompanying text.
259
See Brake, supra note 257 at 77-78; Sias v. City Demonstration Agency,
588 F.2d 692, 695 (9th Cir.1978) (“The purpose of [the retaliation provision’s
opposition clause] is to protect the employee who utilizes the tools provided by
Congress to protect his rights. If the availability of that protection were to turn on
whether the employee’s charge were ultimately found to be meritorious, resort to the
remedies provided by the Act would be severely chilled.”).
260
See Burlington Northern v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 60-68 (2006). The Court in
Burlington expanded the scope of adverse employment actions protected by the
retaliation clause to be larger than those protected by Title VII. Id. The Court
reasoned that “[i]nterpreting the anti-retaliation provision to provide broad protection
from retaliation helps assure the cooperation upon which accomplishment of [Title
VII’s] primary objective depends.” Id. at 67.
261
See CBOCS West, Inc. v. Humphries, 128 S. Ct. 1951, 1951-55 (2008)
(holding that 42 U.S.C. § 1981 includes protection from retaliation); EEOC v.
Romeo Cmty. Schools, 976 F.2d 985, 989 (6th Cir. 1992) (holding that an employee
who informally complained of gender-based discrimination is protected from
retaliation under the Equal Pay Act); Davis v. Flexman, 109 F. Supp. 2d 776, 803
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behind Title VII’s retaliation provision support protecting an employee
who rebuffs her supervisor’s sexual advances and protection of
employees in this situation is critical to enforcing Title VII’s remedial
provisions.
C. Practical Considerations
Several practical considerations further support the need to protect
employees who rebuff their supervisor’s sexual advances. First,
protecting this type of activity under the retaliation provision
maintains traditional distinctions between harassment and retaliation
claims. Some courts fear that protecting employees in this situation
could expand the scope of protection under the retaliation provision so
far that “every harassment claim would automatically state a
retaliation claim”. 262 This type of concern misses the subtle
distinctions between harassment and retaliation claims. Similar facts
can be plead under all claims, but each claim has a different legal
focus. 263
Even a joint quid pro quo and harassment claim based on an
employee saying “no” to a demand for “sex or your job” does not
impermissibly blur the line between harassment and retaliation. While
the facts are the same, the focus of the legal claims is not—one
focuses on the harassment of an employee based on their status as a
man or woman, the other on the employee’s actions based on that
perceived harassment. 264 Further, even if a holding that rebuffing
n.26 (S.D. Ohio 1999) (protecting an employee from retaliation under the
Rehabilitation Act, even though the Act does not contain an express retaliation
provision).
262
E.g. Del Castillo v. Pathmark Stores, Inc., 941 F. Supp. 437, 438-39 (S.D.
N.Y. 1996).
263
Harassment claims focus on the underlying sexual activity and how it
changed the terms or conditions of employment. See supra Part II.A. A retaliation
claim, on the other hand, focuses on an employer’s reaction to perceived harassment.
See supra Part II.B.
264
See Tate v. Executive Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 2007 WL 1650410, *2 (N.D. Ind.
2007), overruled by Tate v. Executive Mgmt. Servs, Inc., 546 F.3d 528 (7th Cir.
2008), cert. denied, 2009 WL 62165 (U.S. 2009) (“When an employee is given an
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sexual advances is protected activity caused harassment and retaliation
claims to overlap, different adverse employment actions are covered
by harassment and retaliation claims. 265 Thus, depending on the type
of adverse employment action an employer takes, one type of claim
may be precluded while the other is not.
As a practical matter, these subtle legal differences create different
results under each type of claim and juries seem to understand the
differences. For instance, when a quid pro quo harassment and
retaliation claim are brought together under similar facts, a jury may
find for the plaintiff on one claim but not the other. 266 Moreover, since
the retaliation provision’s utility as an enforcement tool of Title VII
centers on the fact that it is intentionally broader than Title VII’s
substantive provisions, it is proper for retaliation claims to be brought
with harassment claims in factually similar scenarios.267 Thus, the
purpose of the retaliation provision and the legal differences between

ultimatum that continued employment depends on continuing a sexual relationship,
and the employee says ‘no more,’ that employee could reasonably be understood to
be opposing continuing the sexual relationship and to be opposing a change in the
terms of his employment. . .When the protesting employee is terminated, the
termination could be motivated by the opposition to the change in employment
terms, the opposition to the sexual relationship, or both. The retaliation claim
intertwines with the harassment claim, but they are not identical.”); Burlington
Northern, 548 U.S. at 63 (“The substantive provision seeks to prevent injury to
individuals based on who they are, i.e., their status. The anti-retaliation provision
seeks to prevent harm to individuals based on what they do, i.e., their conduct.”);
Brake, supra note 257, at 48 (“Intentional discrimination, also known as differential
treatment and distinguished from disparate impact, typically denotes unfavorable
treatment directed at someone because of his or her race, sex or other protected class
status. The touchstone of the retaliation claim, on the other hand, is that the
complainant was retaliated against for his or her actions opposing discrimination. . . .
Unlike the prototypical intentional discrimination model, the retaliation claim asserts
that the harm was inflicted because of the complainant’s actions, apart from his or
her protected class status.”).
265
See Burlington Northern 548 U.S. at 60-68.
266
This is exactly what happened in Tate. See Tate v. Executive Mgmt. Servs.,
Inc., 546 F.3d 528, 531 (7th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 2009 WL 62165 (U.S. 2009).
267
See Part V.B.
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harassment and retaliation claims demonstrate that the two areas of
law will not be improperly expanded or blurred.
Second, protecting employees who rebuff their supervisor’s
sexual advances is consistent with current precedent and would not
expand employer liability too far. In his concurrence in Crawford,
Justice Alito expressed concern about making employers liable for
harassment when an employee fails to express “a word of opposition”
to the employer. 268 He noted that an employer could become liable for
any adverse employment action taken against an employee who only
expresses opposition while chatting to a co-worker around a water
cooler, in a telephone conversation overheard by another co-worker, at
a restaurant or tavern with co-workers, or at a picnic attended by a
friend or relative of a supervisor. 269 Further expanding the scope of an
employer’s liability to cover these situations could result in plaintiffs
filing more retaliation claims against employers. 270
Holding that an employee who rebuffs her employer’s sexual
advances has engaged in opposition activity will not result in the type
of drastic expansion of retaliation claims that could overburden courts.
An employee who complains to her supervisor has in fact
communicated a word of opposition to her employer. Further, the
situations described by Justice Alito, such as the water cooler or picnic
scnarioes, involve opposition that is voiced either to a co-worker or a
non-coworker friend. 271 The situation in Tate, however, involved
voicing opposition to a supervisor, not a mere co-worker. 272
268

Crawford v. Metropolitan Gov’t of Nashville and Davidson Cty., Tenn. 129
S.Ct. 846, 854 (2009) (Alito, J. concurring).
269
Id. Holding employers liable for adverse employment actions in these
situations would be problematic because of the lack of notice to management about
the employee’s opposition. See id.
270
Id. at 854-55. Retaliation claims have rapidly increased at the EEOC in
recent years. Courts are aware of this phenomena and therefore seem hesitant to
expand liability in a way that could have the practical result of flooding the courts
with more retaliation lawsuits. See id.
271
See id. at 854.
272
For a discussion of the legally significant difference between supervisors
and co-workers, see supra Part V.A.
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Additionally, unlike a conversation at a bar or picnic, the employee in
Tate expressed his opposition in the workplace, not outside the
workplace.
These factual distinctions are critical because they put the
employer on notice and distinguish this situation from those that have
the true potential to expand liability for retaliation claims to an
unmanageable level. Additionally, other types of informal opposition
already protected under the retaliation clause include defying an
employer’s order, 273 complaining to a newspaper, 274 and maintaining
the status quo by refusing to implement an employer’s discriminatory
order. 275 Protecting an employee who informally complains to her
supervisor about harassment is not a radical departure from these
precedents. Thus, protecting employees who rebuff their supervisor’s
advances will not significantly expand the scope of employer liability
under the retaliation provision or flood the courthouse doors with
retaliation claims.
Finally, employees must have the ability to combat harassment at
its point of origin and be free from retaliation for doing so. While few
lawsuits are likely to hinge on this precise factual issue, 276 holding that
273

See Moyo v. Gomez, 40 F.3d 982, 985 (9th Cir.1994), cert. denied (1995).
Johnson v. Univ. of Cincinnati, 215 F.3d 561, 579, 580 (6th Cir.2000), cert.
denied, 531 U.S. 1052 (2000) (holding that opposition activity includes
“complaining to anyone (management, unions, other employees, or newspapers)
about allegedly unlawful practices; refusing to obey an order because the worker
thinks it is unlawful under Title VII; and opposing unlawful acts by persons other
than the employer-e.g., former employers, union, and co-workers.”).
275
See id. See also Yanowitz v. L’Oreal USA, Inc., 116 P.3d 1123, 1036 (Cal.
2005) (holding that “that an employee’s refusal to follow a supervisor’s order that
she reasonably believes to be discriminatory constitutes protected activity under the
[Fair Employment and Housing Act] and that an employer may not retaliate against
an employee on the basis of such conduct when the employer, in light of all the
circumstances, knows that the employee believes the order to be discriminatory,
even when the employee does not explicitly state to her supervisor or employer that
she believes the order to be discriminatory”).
276
Employees will often later oppose harassment in other ways such as
complaining to a different member of management, or filing an internal grievance or
EEOC charge. See Ogden v. Wax Works, Inc. 214 F.3d 999, 1004-05 (8th Cir.
274
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rebuffing a supervisor’s sexual advances does not constitute
opposition activity may have the practical result of discouraging
employees from combating and resolving harassment at its earliest
stage. Such a result would undermine the ability of employees to
enforce Title VII’s remedial provisions, run counter to the language of
the retaliation provision, and violate Title VII’s most important
policies.
CONCLUSION
The language, purpose, and practical implications of the
retaliation clause show that rebuffing a supervisor’s demand for sex
should usually constitute opposition activity. Courts must still examine
the facts of each case and this situation should not qualify as
opposition activity as a matter of law. However, when the facts are
close, the line should be drawn in favor of holding that an employee
who rebuffs his supervisor’s sexual advances has opposed an unlawful
employment practice. A policy in favor of protecting employees in this
situation fits the language of the retaliation provision, follows
Supreme Court precedent interpreting the opposition clause, serves the
purposes of Title VII and the retaliation provision, and provides
protection for employees in a particularly vulnerable situation.
The fact that the employee in Tate had engaged in a consensual
sexual relationship with his boss and responded to her ultimatum by
saying he wasn’t “messing with” her anymore presented the jury with
a very close factual scenario. The jury resolved it in favor of Tate. The
Seventh Circuit, however, resolved it in favor of Tate’s employer and a
strict reading of the reasonable belief requirement. In doing so, the
Seventh Circuit parsed the record for statements indicating that Tate
didn’t believe he was being harassed and overturned the will of the
jury. Given the close factual scenario and established reasonable belief
requirement, the Seventh Circuit’s decision is understandable. Still, the
Seventh Circuit’s decision in Tate disregards the complete factual
2000). In addition to rebuffing her supervisor, Ogden later complained to
management. Id.
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circumstances of the case as well as the language and policy
considerations that support protecting an employee in Tate’s situation.
Alshafi Tate was repeatedly given an ultimatum from his
supervisor to choose between sex and his job, he voiced opposition to
the supervisor about that ultimatum, and when he finally rebuffed the
supervisor’s sexual advances, he was sent home and fired before he
could report to work the next morning. Employees in these types of
situations must be protected from retaliation. A failure to do so may
have the perverse result of handicapping an employee’s ability to resist
harassment while they are actually being harassed. The language of
Title VII, the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the meaning of
opposed, and the purpose of the retaliation provision all demonstrate
that in close factual scnarioes like the one in Tate, courts should draw
the line in favor of protecting employees. By doing so, courts not only
remain true to the language and purpose of Title VII, but they protect
employees when it matters most by giving a legal backbone to the idea
that “no means no.”
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